Abstract Even as data and analytics-driven applications are becoming increasingly popular, retrieving data from shared databases poses a threat to the privacy of their users. For example, investors/patients retrieve records about stocks/diseases they are interested in from a stock/medical database. Knowledge of such interest is sensitive information that the database server would have access to, unless some mitigating measures are deployed. Private information retrieval (PIR) is a promising security primitive to protect the privacy of users' interests. PIR allows the retrieval of a data record from a database without letting the database server know which record is being retrieved. The privacy guarantees could either be information theoretic or computational. Alternatively, anonymizers, which hide the identities of data users, may be used to protect the privacy of users' interests for some situations. In this paper, we study rPIR, a new family of information-theoretic PIR schemes using ramp secret sharing. We have designed four rPIR schemes, using three ramp secret sharing approaches, achieving answer communication costs close to the cost of non-private information retrieval. Evaluation shows that, for many practical settings, rPIR schemes can achieve lower communication costs and the same level of privacy compared with traditional informationtheoretic PIR schemes and anonymizers. Efficacy of the proposed schemes is demonstrated for two very different scenarios (outsourced data sharing and P2P content delivery) with realistic analysis and experiments. In many situations of these two scenarios, rPIR's advantage of low communication cost outweighs its disadvantages, which results in less expenditure and/or better quality of service compared with what may be achieved if traditional information-theoretic PIR and anonymizers are used.
Introduction
Sharing of data and information forms the cornerstone of collaboration, and is vital in many scenarios. Consequently, while retrieving data from shared databases is an indispensable way of obtaining up-to-date information, it also poses a threat to the privacy of data users. For example, investors retrieving records of stocks of interest from a public database may wish to keep the identities of retrieved records private from the server. Even seemingly harmless information, e.g., one's interests in music or movies may reveal personal information [1] that may need protection. To protect user interest privacy, private information retrieval (PIR) [2] was proposed.
As an alternative to PIR, an individual user's interest may also be protected using anonymizers like onion routers [3] , which relay encrypted records from the database server to the user. However, it is hard to hide user interests using anonymizers if the database is shared with only one or a few users, or under other constraints such as authenticated access. Moreover, in some applications, a user's access pattern or the overall interests of all users may contain sensitive information and need protection even if user identities are hidden with anonymizers.
Direct application of PIR allows to query a record by the record's index (identity). Here, a record could be a row of a relational database, a file, a file chuck, etc. Based on PIR, advanced privacy-preserving queries like queries by keywords [4] and SQL-like queries over relational databases [5] are realized. This privacy primitive has been used in diverse settings including patent databases [6] , pharmaceutical databases [6] , e-mail systems [7] , P2P file sharing systems [8] , etc.
There are two types of PIR: itPIR (information-theoretic PIR) and cPIR (computational PIR). The privacy in cPIR is guaranteed subject to computational bounds on the server, while itPIR provides unconditional privacy. cPIR schemes are only practical for restricted database sizes, and their computational costs are several orders higher than those of itPIR schemes. Their communication costs are also higher than those of most itPIR schemes. In this paper, we focus on itPIR. All itPIR schemes require multiple independent servers and assume that not all of these servers collude. An itPIR scheme is a t-private k-server scheme if it requires k servers and is resistant against the collusion of up to t servers (illustrated in Fig. 1 ). The assumption that not all (or many) servers collude may be restrictive for certain situations, but for many other scenarios, it is also reasonable. The database could be outsourced to PIR servers provided by different cloud providers. Cloud providers are competing with each other and have market reputation to maintain, creating disincentives for collusion. Regulatory obligations may also prevent independent services from exchanging information among themselves. Alternatively, PIR could be used in P2P environment, where peers act as PIR servers. With a sufficient fraction of honest peers in the population, the necessary independence may be achieved. Most widely used anonymous communication systems like Freenet [9] and Tor [10] also rely on the same assumption to protect privacy. Thus to say, our current work is based on assumptions which are quite standard in the literature, and these are reasonable in many scenarios. As such, the focus of our paper is not so much on how these assumptions are realized, enforced or verified, and more on, what can be achieved if the assumptions hold.
Motivation
In this paper, we propose and study a new family of PIR schemes named rPIR, which applies ramp secret sharing.
(Most existing itPIR schemes use perfect threshold secret sharing. In Sect. 2, we discuss more about secret sharing and existing itPIR schemes.) Compared with traditional itPIR schemes and anonymizers, rPIR has low answer communication cost in terms of the traffic from servers to data users. Another distinctive aspect of rPIR is its use of multi-query along with ramp secret sharing. By multi-query we mean that multiple records or segments of one or more records are queried in a single retrieval operation. By the term "record" we refer to the smallest unit of data that a user wants, and we view a database as a collection of "data items", which may refer to records or record segments. Multi-query may in fact be applied to retrieve multiple data items, which are not necessarily records. The mechanism of using multi-query along with ramp secret sharing will be detailed in Sect. 2.1.
The low(er) answer communication cost makes rPIR very useful for two types of applications. First, rPIR benefits applications sensitive to communication cost, e.g., the data owner sharing (particularly big) files with mobile users with very limited or expensive wireless bandwidth. For many practical settings, especially for big record sizes, we achieve an overall communication cost with rPIR which is significantly lower than that of traditional itPIR schemes and anonymizers, but at the expense of deploying more servers. Given enough servers, we can even push rPIR's communication cost asymptotically close to that of non-private information retrieval. In contrast, the communication cost of traditional itPIR schemes and anonymizers is at least several times higher than that of non-private retrieval. Second, rPIR benefits scenarios which are more sensitive to answer communication cost. In the most typical itPIR scenario, the data owner outsources the shared data to multiple independent clouds, which act as PIR servers. Cloud service providers like Amazon, Google and Microsoft charge the data owner for the bandwidth usage. Reducing answer communication cost saves the data owner's operational costs.
Contributions
Our contributions are threefold:
-We design four rPIR schemes with distinct properties.
Specifically, two rPIR schemes (we call them PIR1 & PIR2) using additive ramp secret sharing are proposed. They both use a trivial ramp secret sharing for t = 1, and [11] 's ramp secret sharing for t > 1. Two further schemes (PIR3 & PIR4) using [12] 's ramp secret sharing are proposed. In order to build PIR schemes from ramp secret sharing, we elaborately design functions for computing PIR servers' answers as well as carefully configure the parameters of PIR and secret sharing. We also design a method to reorganize and index the data in PIR2 and PIR4. These four schemes have different answer communication costs, question communication costs and computational costs. Their characteristics make them suitable for different situations with different record
Fig. 1 t-private k-server itPIR. A data user applies t-private k-server
PIR to retrieve a record as follows: the user generates a set of questions based on the desired record's index; sends each server a question; each server returns the user a corresponding answer; the user recovers the record based on all the responses. As long as no more than t servers collude, they cannot learn any non-trivial information about the record's index (and thus, about which record the user was actually interested in)
sizes, numbers of records, privacy requirements and numbers of available servers. -We evaluate rPIR schemes' communication and computational costs. We reduce answer communication cost by using more servers. However, using more servers increases the communication cost of database updates and potentially also raises the risk of privacy leakage. Therefore, considering different limits on the number of servers and privacy requirements, overall communication cost is evaluated for both the case of static databases and that of frequently changing databases with non-negligible data update overheads across multiple servers. The result shows that, compared with traditional itPIR schemes, rPIR can reduce communication cost and simultaneously achieve the same level of privacy for many settings. Our analysis also shows that PIR1 and PIR3 can achieve computational costs lower than that of the best itPIR scheme for some situations (which we characterize during the analysis of our results (I) Outsourced data sharing is the most typical usage scenario or itPIR. The data owner shares data via multiple outsourced storages, which act as PIR servers. This paper shows that rPIR's higher computational cost won't decrease QoS, while its lower communication cost could improve QoS. Moreover, it could save data users' and data owner's network traffic (and associated costs). (II) In the P2P content delivery scenario, cPIR and anonymizers have been proposed to hide users' interests [8, 9] . However, [8] showed that current cPIR schemes are not practical in this scenario due to its high computational cost. In this paper, we propose an itPIR-based P2P content delivery system where a lot of peers act as PIR servers. Our experiments show that for most cases, the performance bottleneck in this setting is the peers' communication resources instead of their computational resources. The maximum system throughput of using rPIR is accordingly at least twice as that of using traditional itPIR schemes and anonymizer-based systems.
Organization
Next, in Sect. 2 we discuss the necessary background and related works. In Sects. 3 and 4, we present our rPIR schemes using additive ramp secret sharing [11] and [12] 's ramp secret sharing, respectively. The communication cost of these novel schemes is evaluated in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we show rPIR's usage in outsourced data sharing and P2P content delivery with realistic settings, and study communication and computational costs' impacts on QoS and expenditure. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 7.
Background and related work
Definitions and Notations We first provide some definitions and notations that will be used throughout the rest of this paper. If not specified otherwise, all notations will bear the meanings as given below: ACI (Answer Cost Index): the ratio of answer traffic amount to the retrieved records' size QCI (Question Cost Index): the ratio of question traffic amount to the retrieved records' size CCI (Communication Cost Index): the ratio of traffic amount to the retrieved records' size n: the number of data items or records in the database l: the data item size or record size in bits k: the number of database servers used in a retrieval t: the maximum number of colluding servers that a PIR scheme can withstand m: the number of retrieved data items in one multi-query retrieval e i : the unit vector where '1' is at the ith position.
: the i-th element of a set X.
×: scalar multiplication operator of two scalars or a scalar with a vector/matrix · : dot product operator of two vectors/matrixes ⊗: tensor multiplication operator of two vectors or matrixes
In this paper, we evaluate communication costs by ACI, QCI and CCI instead of traffic amounts for the following reason. This paper involves both single-query and multiquery PIR schemes. Different schemes may retrieve different amounts of data in one round of retrieval. It is much easier to compare these schemes' communication costs by ACI, QCI and CCI.
Background: secret sharing
Secret sharing was invented independently by Adi Shamir [13] and George Blakley [14] in 1979 for securely distributing and recovering secrets. A secret sharing scheme is used to distribute a secret among a group of participants. It breaks a secret into shares, and each participant is allocated a share. The secret can be recovered only when a certain quorum of participants combine their shares together. Therefore, an attacker has to compromise multiple participants to steal the secret, and the normal secret recovery can have some tolerance over the absence of some participants.
This paper involves two types of secret sharing schemes: perfect threshold secret sharing and ramp secret sharing. In perfect threshold secret sharing, there is a threshold t. Any non-trivial information of the secret cannot be learned from t or less shares, while the entire secret can be recovered from more than t shares. In ramp secret sharing, e.g., [11, 12, 15, 16] , there are two thresholds t and K . Any nontrivial information of the secret cannot be learned from t or less shares; partial information can be learned from t + 1 to K − 1 shares; the entire secret can be recovered from K or more shares. These two types of schemes share the same property: t or less shares do not expose any non-trivial information of the secret. This property is exploited to assure the t-private property of PIR schemes, and these secret sharing schemes are referred to as t-private secret sharing schemes in this paper.
Preliminary:
Information-theoretic PIR based on secret sharing [17, 18] found that secret sharing and share conversion are the key techniques used implicitly or explicitly by most existing itPIR schemes. (Share conversion refers to the method of converting a share of a secret to a share of another secret.) These schemes share the same underlying mechanism. In this paper, we extend this approach to cover also rPIR schemes by considering the case of using multi-query and ramp secret sharing. The extended mechanism is given as follows.
-Question generation and transmission. The user uses a t-private secret sharing scheme to break a secret (or a set of secrets) containing the index(es) of the requested data item(s) (we call it input secret) into shares, and sends each share (or a set of different secrets' shares) to a server as a question. -Share conversion and transmission. Each server converts its received question to an answer locally with a function elaborately chosen/designed in the itPIR scheme and sends its answer to the server. The database is also used in the evaluating of the function. Each answer is a share of a secret containing the value(s) of the requested data item(s) (we call it output secret) under a t-private secret sharing scheme. This scheme may not be identical to the scheme used to break up the input secret. -Data recovery. The user recovers the output secret, which contains the requested data item(s), from the received answers.
The t-private property of secret sharing assures the t-private property of PIR. Many itPIR schemes use perfect threshold secret sharing, while we apply ramp secret sharing instead in this work. When using perfect threshold secret sharing, the input secret contains all information of the requested data item's index, and the output secret is the item's value. When using ramp secret sharing, the input secret in contrast contains all information of multiple requested data items' indexes, and the output secret is the requested items' values. In perfect threshold secret sharing, share length is no shorter than secret length. Ramp secret sharing was invented to reduce share length. That is why we use ramp secret sharing to design PIR schemes with low answer communication cost.
itPIR schemes with low answer communication cost
Communication cost is one of the major barriers to PIR's use in practice. Efforts to design PIR schemes with low communication cost predominantly focused on reducing question communication cost, but the lowest answer communication cost remained the same. In this paper, we use the ACI (Answer Cost Index), QCI (Question Cost Index) and CCI (Communication Cost Index) defined at the beginning of this section to evaluate answer, question and overall communication cost respectively. Henry et al.'s work [19] is, to our best knowledge, the only other ramp secret sharing-based PIR scheme in literature. PIR3 in this paper is essentially very close to Henry et al.'s scheme (though designed independently), and it may be viewed as a variant of [19] 's scheme optimized to reduce communication cost. Therefore, in this paper, the comparative evaluation of other rPIR schemes against PIR3 is indicative of what could be achieved by optimizing [19] 's approach. [19] 's scheme and PIR3 differ in three aspects. First, [19] 's scheme uses a more complicated data item recovery method. This method is resistant to wrong answers returned by malicious servers and lost answers, but is not optimized for communication cost. Second, they are used with different settings. [19] compares its scheme with previous robust PIR schemes [20, 21] assuming they have the same settings of t and k. Under this assumption, [19] optimizes other parameters and explores the tradeoff between robustness and communication cost. The best ACI of [19] 's scheme is k/(k − t − 1), while [19] focuses on the setting achieving an ACI of k/( √ k × t − t) considering above tradeoff. In contrast, our study on rPIR is not limited in the area of robust itPIR, and we optimize t and k under different numbers of available servers and privacy levels. In our settings, PIR3's ACI is k/(k − t). As we optimize t and k, we can always make ACI lower than 2 and even close to 1 given enough servers. Third, they are used in different situations. [19] uses its scheme when data item size l is not smaller than the number of data item n, because that makes its scheme's CCI lowest. In contrast, we recommend to use PIR3 when l n. Our goal is to make rPIR outperform traditional itPIR and anonymizers in terms of overall communication cost. It requires to use rPIR schemes for situations where question length can be much shorter than answer length. Only when l n, PIR3's question length is much shorter than answer length, and its use can be advocated. Otherwise, we have to apply significantly different approaches, studied as PIR2 and PIR4.
Though Henry et al. do a thorough study about ramp secret sharing for robustness in itPIR, using ramp secret sharing for itPIR in general has not yet been well studied. Specifically, [19] focuses on the tradeoff between communication cost and robustness under given settings of t and k. Optimizing t and k to minimize the communication costs under required robustness levels and/or privacy levels has not been studied. Actually, if optimizing t and k, [19] 's scheme could further reduce communication cost and still achieve the same robustness level (e.g., resilience to the same ratio of lost/wrong answers) as previous robust schemes do. In this paper, we have 4 rPIR schemes using 3 ramp secret sharing schemes. In contrast with [19] 's scheme and PIR3, which can be viewed as an optimized variant of the former, PIR2 and PIR4 use ramp secret sharing in more complicated ways to achieve lower question communication costs. PIR3 and analogously [19] are not recommended for some situations as other 3 rPIR schemes all have advantages over PIR3. We compare rPIR with the best traditional itPIR schemes with lowest communication/computational costs (which are not robust) and anonymizers. By evaluating rPIR in realistic scenarios, we show that rPIR could be used in much broader settings and for much more applications. This paper studies not only communication cost under different server number limits but also computation cost, QoS and expenditure. Moreover, this paper is the first work studying itPIR's usage in P2P content delivery.
Though this paper doesn't focus on robustness of itPIR, our study could be applied to the area of robust itPIR to reduce communication cost. The study of robustness is orthogonal to our work. Techniques of [19] and other robust PIR schemes like [20, 21] could be applied to PIR3 and PIR4, but is left for future work. The robustness of PIR1 and PIR2 also can be improved using the basic idea of existing robust itPIR schemes: configuring the parameters of secret sharing to add redundancy in PIR's questions and answers.
The smallest answer length in traditional itPIR schemes (i.e., schemes not using ramp secret sharing) is the same as the record length. So the best ACI is equal to the number of database servers k. Table 1 lists all the best traditional itPIR schemes that we could identify. To the best of our knowledge, the listed ACIs are the lowest among traditional PIR schemes. To compare ACI and QCI, the schemes listed in Table 1 are all t-private schemes for retrieving l-bit length records. Most schemes are generalized or transformed from the 1-private schemes or from the schemes for retrieving 1-bit length records as originally given in the referenced papers. Transforming a scheme for 1-bit records to one for l-bit records is trivial. The last four schemes in Table  1 are transformed from the 1-private schemes in [22] [23] [24] [25] using [26] 's method, which can transform any 1-private kserver itPIR scheme to a t-private k t -server scheme. The first two schemes in Table 1 are generalized from two 1-private schemes in [2] . We will summarize these two generalized schemes in Sect. 3 since two of our schemes build upon them. 
t-Private PIR based on [22] and [26] 3 t AC I × t × n O(1/ log log n) /l t-Private scheme based on [23] and [26] 
t-Private PIR based on [24] and [26] (r > 1)
t-Private scheme based on [25] and [26] (r > 1) r is even:
Methods to reduce any PIR's communication cost
Other than designing new itPIR schemes with low communication cost, efforts have also been taken to develop methods that can be generally applied to any PIR scheme to reduce communication cost. These methods can reduce any PIR scheme's question cost and also the answer cost of some schemes. However, the best ACI of itPIR is not improved.
[27] proposed a family of codes called batch codes to reduce PIR's communication and also computational cost. Batch code can be used only when the user retrieves multiple records. The database is encoded into multiple blocks using the batch code, whereas the block size is smaller than the database size. The user employs a PIR scheme to retrieve a data item from every block and reconstructs multiple records from the retrieved data items. Any cPIR or itPIR scheme may be used in conjunction with batch codes. With batch codes, every block is treated as a smaller database and, since computational cost, question length and some PIR schemes' answer length are related to database size, all those complexities can be reduced. However, itPIR schemes' best answer length is the same as the data item length, which is not linked to database size. Obviously, the total length of retrieved data items cannot be smaller than the total length of all records reconstructed from these items. Therefore, the ACI for retrieving multiple records using batch code is not smaller than that for retrieving a single data item from a block. Hence, the best ACI of itPIR is not improved.
Bounding-box PIR has been proposed by [28] to reduce cPIR's computational and communication costs. The same idea may be used to reduce itPIR's communication cost as well: namely, by using PIR to retrieve a desired record from a large enough portion (defined by the bounding-box) of the database instead of considering the whole database. The database server then only knows that the user retrieves a record from among this portion. Obviously, the portion should be large enough to meet the user's privacy requirements. We can treat this portion of the database simply as a smaller database. And because computational cost, question length and some PIR schemes' answer length are linked to database size, they can be all reduced. However, existing PIR schemes' best answer length is not dependent on database size. So again, the best ACI is not improved.
[27]'s batch code and [28] 's idea of bounding-box can be applied to any PIR scheme including our schemes. Our rPIR schemes are most useful whenever question communication cost plays less of a role relative to answer communication cost. Still, related works like batch code or bounding-box may be used together with our rPIR schemes in order to reduce question communication cost as well as computational cost.
rPIR using additive ramp secret sharing
In this section, we present two rPIR schemes using additive ramp secret sharing (PIR1 and PIR2) as well as the related secret sharing schemes.
Additive secret sharing
Trivial Additive Secret Sharing A secret s is represented by a vector over F 2 . Suppose the vector length is h. Then, s ∈ F h 2 . The user breaks s into t +1 additive shares by generating t uniform random vectors
. Any t shares reveal no information about the secret. Trivial Additive Ramp Secret Sharing When t is 1, we use this secret sharing scheme in PIR1 and PIR2. In all our rPIR schemes, a secret can be divided into some blocks, each of which is a vector. Suppose a secret with u blocks is {s i : i = 1, 2, . . . ,u and s i ∈ F h 2 }. As shown below, the secret can be broken into u + 1 additive shares, and any block can be recovered by adding some shares. Any individual share reveals no information about the secret.
Share generation
Secret block recovery V [1] : chosen uniformly at random [11] 's scheme with the setting K = N and L = K − t in PIR1 and PIR2. In [11] 's scheme, a secret is divided into L × (n p − 1) blocks, which are further broken into N shares. Each share has n p −1 pieces. n p is a prime not less than N . Each secret block can be recovered by adding a certain combination of share pieces from any K shares. Any K − L shares reveal no information about the secret. Every share piece and secret block is a vector over Field F 2 with the same length. Due to space limitation and the complexity of [11] 's scheme, we omit a formal description of the algorithm from [11] but show an example of creating shares and recovering a secret instead as below. In the example, N = K = 3, L = 1 and n p = 3. The secret with L × (n p − 1) = 2 blocks s 1 and s 2 is broken into N = 3 shares. Each share has n p − 1 = 2 pieces. The i-th share's j-th piece is denoted as sp i, j . 
vectors chosen uniformly at random
PIR1: rPIR scheme based on t-private (t + 1)-server single-query PIR
Preliminary: t-private (t + 1)-server single-query PIR PIR1 is designed based on this t-private (t +1)-server singlequery PIR scheme, and the latter is a trivial generalization of a 1-private 2-server scheme in [2] . Suppose the database has n data items and each item's size is l bits. There are k = t + 1 servers indexed from 1 to k, each of which holds a replication of the database. We use a set of vectors
to represent the collection of data items in the database. The i-th data item X [i] ∈ F l 2 can be evaluated with the following linear function over field F 2 . Here, Y j is the j-th component of the vector Y .
Note that X [i] = P(e i ) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}, where e i is a unit vector in F n 2 and only the i-th component is 1. Therefore, the retrieval of X [i] can be reduced to an evaluation of the function P(Y ) on a point e i where the servers hold P(Y ) and the user holds i. This scheme uses additive secret sharing to prevent up to t colluding servers to recover the secret e i . The user retrieves the data item 
. ,k}. The question length is n. (III) The j-th server uses its received vector to compute P(V [ j]), and returns the result to the user as an answer. So k servers compute and return k answers in total. Each answer's length is l. (IV)
The user reconstructs data item X [i] (i.e., the output secret) with the answers using the equation below, where S i is the set of e i 's additive shares.
PIR1: rPIR scheme based on t-private (t + 1)-server PIR The same as the above scheme, any data item in the database can be evaluated with the function P(Y ) in (1). Different from the above scheme, this scheme is a multi-query scheme. When t = 1, k − t data items can be retrieved using k servers in one multi-query retrieval.
data items can be retrieved using k servers in one retrieval. Here, k > t, and n p is a prime not less than k. Each data item may be a record or record segment. A user may use this scheme to get multiple records or segments of one or more records through one or more retrievals. The user can decide the number of retrieved data items and the number of servers to use in each retrieval considering the number of wanted records, the number of available servers and communication cost. The user may choose the segment size so that the number of retrieved data items becomes a desire value. The last segment of each record may be padded with zeros to make all data items share the same size. If data items are record segments, the user needs to let servers know the segment size so that the user and servers share the same layout of the database. Here, we suppose the user chooses to use k servers to get a set of data items {X [i] : i ∈ I } in one retrieval, where I is a subset of {1, 2, . . . ,n}. The number of retrieved data items, |I |, is set to a desired value by the user. If t = 1, the number of retrieved data items |I | is set to k − t. Otherwise, Remark. We can see that PIR1 is designed based on the above single-query scheme. More specifically, PIR1 reuses functions (1) and (2) . From Sect. 2.1, we know that question generation, question to answer conversion and data item recovery are the key steps in an itPIR scheme. PIR1 is different from the single-query scheme in these steps: PIR1 uses ramp secret sharing to generate questions, and the ways of using the functions (1) and (2) to convert questions and recover data items are different.
Communication cost. The number of servers is k. If t = 1, the number of retrieved data items is k − t, question length is n, and answer length is l. If t > 1, the number of retrieved data items is (k −t)×(n p −1), question length is n×(n p −1), and answer length is l ×(n p −1). So no matter whether t = 1 or not, ACI is k/(k − t) and QCI is AC I × n/l.
Computational cost. In both PIR1 and [2] 's t-private (t + 1)-server PIR, function (1) is used to compute answers. As the computation is in the field F 2 , this function can be evaluated by XORing O(n) data items. The exact number of XORed items is the number of "1"s in the function's input Y , which is n/2 on an average. So, on an average, (n/2 − 1) × l ≈ n × l/2 bit XOR operations are needed to evaluate this function, and the computational cost depends on the database size. In PIR1, when t = 1 (or t > 1), a server computes an answer by evaluating this function once (or n p − 1 times). When t = 1, to compute an answer, the server's computational cost is the same as the cost in [2] 's PIR. No matter whether t = 1 or not, evaluating times per retrieved item is k/(k − t), which can be reduced to lower than 2 and even close to 1. If a data item is a record, evaluating times per retrieved record of PIR1 is lower than that of [2] 's scheme, i.e., PIR1's computational cost is lower. If retrieved data items are segments of a record, PIR1's computational cost is higher. We will analyze how the computational cost affects PIR1's usage of retrieving segments in Sect. 6.
[11]'s ramp secret sharing also can be used for t = 1. However, compared with using trivial additive ramp secret sharing, it has higher computational cost and requires the user to retrieve more data items. So it is preferable to just use the trivial secret sharing scheme when t = 1.
Security. As discussed in Sect. 2.1, the security of itPIR schemes based on secret sharing depends on the secret sharing schemes they use. The security of PIR1 depends on the trivial additive ramp secret sharing scheme and [11] 's scheme. In PIR1, questions are generated by breaking desired data items' indices with these secret sharing schemes. These schemes make sure that any t or less servers cannot learn any non-trivial information about the indices. 
PIR2: rPIR scheme based on t-private
The user retrieves 
. . .
PIR2: rPIR scheme based on t-private (t +1) d -server PIR
The same as in above single-query scheme, any data item in the database can be evaluated with function (3) . In this scheme, there are k
Each data item is a record segment. Suppose the user wants to retrieve the set of data items belonging to a record
n}. Before using this scheme, each record is split into |I 1| × |I 2|×· · ·×|I d| data items, and data items are organized in the matrix X . The user needs to send |I 1|, |I 2|, |I 3|, . . . , |I d| to servers for this preprocessing. After organizing, the same as the indices of above data items, the indices of any record's data items are a tensor product of d sets. The way of splitting records and indexing data items is as follows. Figure 2 provides an accompanying toy example. 
, which is the data item's index. Remark. We can see that PIR2 is designed based on the above single-query scheme. More specifically, PIR2 reuses the functions (3) and (4). However, the key steps in PIR2 are different: ramp secret sharing is used in question generation, and the way the functions (3) and (4) are used in PIR2's question answer conversion and data item recovery are also distinct. Besides, PIR2 has an additional preprocessing step of splitting records into data items and organizing data items in the database. In this scheme, a data item is a record segment, and all segments of a record are retrieved with one multi-query retrieval. Because of the constraints on the relation among the retrieved data items' indices, this scheme cannot retrieve data items that are arbitrarily chosen records with one multi-query retrieval.
Communication cost. In this rPIR scheme, the number of servers is (n pi − 1). So no matter whether t is 1 or not, ACI is (3) is used to compute answers. As the computation is in the field F 2 , on average, (n/2 d − 1) × l ≈ n × l/2 d bit XOR operations are needed to evaluate this function. This function's computational cost depends on the database size. In PIR2, when t = 1 (or t > 1), a server computes an answer by evaluating this function once (or d i=1 (n pi − 1) times). In [2] 's t-private (t + 1) d -server PIR, a server needs to evaluate this function once to compute an answer. As PIR2 uses more servers than [2] 's scheme does, the total computational cost in PIR2 is higher wether t = 1 or not. Therefore, PIR2 makes a tradeoff of computational cost for communication cost.
Computational cost. In both PIR2 and [2]'s t-private
[11]'s ramp secret sharing also can be used when t is 1. Compared with using the trivial ramp secret sharing, it has a bit lower QCI but higher computational cost.
Security. The same as PIR1, the security of PIR2 depends on the trivial additive ramp secret sharing scheme and [11] 's scheme. In PIR2, each data item is indexed with an ordered d-tuple, and questions are generated by breaking the tuple elements of desired items' indices with two ramp secret sharing schemes. These schemes make sure that any t or less servers cannot learn any non-trivial information about the tuple elements of the indices.
Sum up
PIR1 and PIR2 are designed based on two PIR schemes from [2] , which uses a trivial additive secret sharing scheme. Different from [2] 's PIR schemes, PIR1 and PIR2 both use a trivial additive ramp secret sharing scheme only for t = 1, but uses [11] 's additive ramp secret sharing for t > 1. PIR1 and PIR2 are related in their use of the underlying secret shadings scheme, but are distinct. PIR1 views a data item index as a simple value, while PIR2 views a data item index as an ordered d-tuple (d is a configurable parameter), which is exploited to lower the question cost index (QCI). PIR1 can be seen as a special case of PIR2 with d = 1. However, PIR1 is much simpler, and its usage is different. PIR1 allows retrieving multiple records or record segments in one multiquery retrieval, while PIR2 only allows to retrieve segments of a single record in one retrieval.
rPIR using Yamamoto's ramp secret sharing
In this section, we present PIR3 and PIR4: two rPIR schemes using Yamamoto's ramp secret sharing [12] .
Yamamoto's ramp secret sharing
In PIR3 and PIR4, we use [12] 's scheme over finite field F 2 w with the setting K = N , L = K − t and 2 w > K . [12] described its scheme in the form of matrix operations. To facilitate its use in this paper, we re-present its scheme in the form of polynomial evaluation and interpolation.
In our rPIR schemes, a secret is a set of u equal-length vectors (i.e., secret blocks) {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s u }. Let h be the vector length. A (u + t)-term vector-valued polynomial function (5) is used to break the secret. In this function, the variable z is a scalar, while constant coefficients are all vectors. In (5), the degrees of all terms {c i : i = 1, 2, . . . ,u + t} are unique, and the degree of the polynomial is at least u + t − 1. Each secret vector s i is a coefficient of the function, and the other coefficients are uniform random vectors. A share of the secret is the output of function at a nonzero point. At most 2 w − 1 shares, {( f (z i )) : z i = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,2 w − 1} could be generated by evaluating the function at 2 w − 1 distinct nonzero points.
Let v be the degree of the polynomial (5). It is well known that it takes v+1 points to define a polynomial of degree v and the coefficients can be found using interpolation. Therefore, given v+1 shares, the secret (i.e., the secret coefficients of the v-degree polynomial) can be recovered using a polynomial interpolation method. Actually, if the degrees of all the terms {c i : i = 1, 2, . . . ,u + t} are made public, the polynomial can be recovered with only u + t shares. (u + t ≤ v + 1.) This is implied in [12] , but we don't need this property to recover data items. It is also shown in [12] that any t shares reveal no information about the secret.
PIR3: a t-private (m + t)-server m-query rPIR scheme
Suppose the database has n data items and each data item's length is l bits. Every data item is indexed with an integer i, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . ,n}. In PIR3, the i-th data item
2 w can be evaluated with the following function over Field F 2 w . w is an integer much smaller than l and n, and 2 w − 1 ≥ m + t. We may need to pad each data item with less than w bits to use a small w and make w|l.
It is easy to notice that X [i] = P(e i ) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. Therefore, the retrieval of X [i] can be reduced to an evaluation of the function P(Y ) on a point e i where the servers hold P(Y ) and the user holds i. The user wants to get m data items in one multi-query retrieval, and the set of their indexes is I . So the input secret is {e i : i ∈ I }. Let s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m be the secret blocks of the input secret. Using k = m + t servers, the user retrieves the data items by the following steps:
(I). The user breaks m secret blocks into k = m + t t-private shares using the method introduced in Section 4.1. The following (k − 1)-degree vector-valued polynomial Q(z) is used. The user generates k distinct shares: {Q(z i )
: z i ∈ F 2 w and z i = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,k}. Remark. PIR3 is a multi-query scheme. It can be used to retrieve multiple records or record segments in one multiquery retrieval. The data items in the database could be records or record segments. This scheme utilizes a vectorvalued polynomial to generate questions, and recovers data items by interpolating a different vector-valued polynomial.
II). The user sends each server a distinct share Q(z i ) as a question, and each server returns the answer P(Q(z i )). As shown below, we define a vector-valued polynomial function R(z) as P(Q(z)). The second equality follows from the linearity of P(Y ).

R(z) = P(Q(z)) =
Communication and computational costs. In PIR3, the question length is w × n, and the answer length is l. ACI is k/(k − t), and QCI is AC I × w × n/l. To compute an answer, a server needs to do N × l/w multiplications and (N − 1) × l/w additions in the field F 2 w . An addition in this field is an XOR operation, and a multiplication can be implemented by looking up a table of pre-computed results. In practice, assuming data item size is multiple bytes, we can set w = 8 to support up to 255 servers, and the table size is only 2 8 × 2 8 × 8 bits = 64 KB.
Security. Similar as PIR1, the security of PIR3 depends on [12] 's secret sharing scheme. This secret sharing scheme makes sure that any t or less servers cannot learn any nontrivial information about the desired data items' indices.
PIR4: an rPIR scheme with QCI of O( AC I ×
Before using this scheme, each record is divided into m = d i=1 u i equal-length data items. The same as PIR2, data items are organized to make the indices of any record's data items be a tensor product of d sets. The process of organizing and indexing data items is the same as in PIR2. After preprocessing, there are n data items in the database. Each data item's length is l bits. Each data item is indexed with an ordered d-tuple (i1, i2, i3 
In this scheme, a data item is a record segment. Suppose the user wants to retrieve the set of data items belonging to a record Remark. Reusing PIR2's idea of preprocessing the database (i.e., splitting records and organizing data items in a multi-dimensional matrix), we are able to build an rPIR scheme with QCI lower than that of PIR3's. Analogous to PIR2, this scheme can be used to retrieve a record's segments but not arbitrarily chosen records with one multi-query retrieval. The challenge of building PIR4 is in designing the vector-valued polynomials for question generation. As mentioned above, to enable share conversion and minimize the number of servers, these polynomial must meet some requirements. As we will see at the end of this section, we have to carefully design them to meet such requirements.
. Ed} into a set of t-private shares using a vector-valued polynomial Q i (z). Then d vector-valued polynomials Q
1 (z), Q 2 (z), Q 3 (z), . .
. ,Q d (z) are used to break up the secrets. These vector-valued polynomials must meet the following requirements: (1)Q i (z) has u i + t terms; (2) all members in E i are u i coefficients in Q i (z), and the other t coefficients of Q i (z) are vectors chosen uniformly at random from F
d √ n 2 w ; (3) every member in {e i1 ⊗ e i2 ⊗ e i3 ⊗ · · · e id : i1 ∈ I 1, i2 ∈ I 2, i3 ∈ I 3, .
. . ,id ∈ I d} is a coefficient of the below function R(z), which is defined as
Q 1 (z) ⊗ Q 2 (z) ⊗ Q 3 (z) ⊗ · · · Q d (z). R(z) = Q 1 (z) ⊗ Q 2 (z) ⊗ Q 3 (z) ⊗ · · · Q d (z) = h i=0 C i × z i , C i is a d-dimensional matrix.
Suppose the degree of R(z) is h. Let C i be the i-th coefficient of R(z). The first two requirements are for input secret breaking, while the third requirement is for output secret recovering. As we can see later, the user recovers data items by interpolating the h-degree polynomial, X · R(z), with answers from h +1 servers. Therefore, the lower the degree of R(z), the better. At the end of this section, we will show a method to create such vector-valued polynomials that can make the degree of R(z) lower than
d i=1 (u i + t) − 1
. (II). The user generates a set of h + 1 d-tuple shares:
S = {(Q 1 (z i ), Q 2 (z i ), Q 3 (z i ), . . . Q d (z i )) : z i ∈ F 2 w and z i = 0, i = 1,
III). The user sends each server a different d-tuple in the set S as a question. (IV). Each server uses its received d-tuple
(Q 1 (z i ), Q 2 (z i ), . . . Q d (z i )) to compute P(Q 1 (z i ), Q 2 (z i ), . . . ,Q d (z i )
) and sends the result to the user as an answer. We define S(z) as P(Q
1 (z), Q 2 (z), Q 3 (z), . . . ,Q d (z)).
Then, as shown below, all answers are the values of S(z) at h + 1 points, and S(z) is an h-degree vectorvalued polynomial function. S(z)
Communication and computational costs. The user can retrieve
servers, and every answer's length is the same as the data item length. So ACI is less than
To compute an answer, a server needs to do d × n ×l/w multiplications and about n × l/w additions in the field F 2 w . The same as PIR3, an addition in this field is an XOR operation, and a multiplication can be implemented by looking up a table of pre-computed results. In practice, we can set w = 8 to support up to 255 servers, and the table size is only 64KB.
When |I 1| = |I 2| = · · · = |I d| = 1, this scheme also works, but turns into a single-query scheme. If using our below described method to create
, the degree of R(z) and S(z), h, is d ×t. So the number of servers is d × t + 1. This single-query scheme's ACI and QCI are the same as the ACI and QCI of [17] 's binary PIR protocols listed in Table 1 . That makes this single-query scheme one with the lowest ACI among all single-query itPIR schemes.
Security. The same as PIR2, the security of PIR4 depends on the underlying secret sharing scheme. In PIR2 and PIR4, each data item is indexed with an ordered d-tuple. This secret sharing scheme makes sure that any t or less servers cannot learn any non-trivial information about the tuple elements of desired data items' indices.
Recall that we need to use Q i (z) to break the secret Ei for i = 1, 2, . . . ,d. We also need the coefficients of
) contain all members of {e i1 ⊗ e i2 ⊗ · · · e id : i1 ∈ I 1, i2 ∈ I 2, . . . ,id ∈ I d} so that the output secret should be recovered by interpolating S(z) = X · R(z). The lower the degree of R(z), the better. The following way of creating
is the best way we could find to achieve a low degree of R(z).
We can create Q1(z), Q2(z), Q3(z), . . . Qd(z) in the form below, and assign every term's degree c i, j a value using a rule described later.
Before describing the rule of assigning degrees, we give some definitions used in the assignment method first. We call a term as a secret term if its coefficient is a secret block or the tensor product of some secret blocks. We refer to a nonsecret term as a random term. A random term's coefficient is a uniform random vector, or a computing result (e.g., tensor product) of some random vector(s) and secret block(s). During the process of assigning degrees to above polynomials, a polynomial may have zero, one or more terms without assigned degrees. We define Q i (z) as the polynomial containing all the terms with assigned degrees in Q i (z) for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,d}, and R(z) as
We assign degrees to the terms of
by the following steps. An example is shown in (9) . In this example, u 1 = u 2 = 2 and t = 1. A more complicated example is shown in (10) where u 1 = u 2 = u 3 = 5 and t = 2.
-First, set c i,1 = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,d.
-Second, set the values of other degrees c i, j one by one in the order of their indexes. The degree of a secret term is set to the current degree of R(z) plus 1. The degree of a random term is set to max(the current degree of Q i (z), the current biggest degree of R(z)'s secret term)+1.
R(z) is computed by adding
The tensor products having the same degree of z will be merged during the addition. The intuition behind above degree assigning rule is to make sure that any tensor product of the secret terms from 
D1(i)
In the example shown in (10), R(z)'s degree is 6 + 20 + 74 = 100, which is bigger than
Communication cost evaluation
Communication cost (with a limit on the number of servers)
First, we show how rPIR's low answer communication cost can result in lower overall communication cost than that of traditional itPIR and anonymizers. The ACIs and QCIs of rPIR schemes are shown in Table 2 . Compared with traditional itPIR, rPIR's ACI is lower, but its QCI is not. rPIR 
a n p is a prime and n p ≥ k b n pi is a prime and n pi ≥ u i + t can achieve a lower overall communication cost when its QCI is much lower than its ACI. In non-private information retrieval, a data user sends a record request to a database server, and the server returns the requested record to the user. The request contains the record ID, which is O(log n) bits long. Then, the sum of ACI and QCI is 1 + (log n)/l, which is close to 1 in most cases. If anonymizers are used to protect data users' privacy, above data user's record request and the returned record should be relayed by at least one anonymizer. Then, the sum of ACI and QCI is at least 2 + (log n)/l, which is close to 2 in most cases. Later we will show that we can push rPIR's ACI to below 2 and even close to 1 if given enough servers. Therefore, when rPIR's QCI is much lower than the ACI, rPIR can achieve an overall communication cost lower than that of traditional itPIR and that of anonymizers.
As we can see from Table 2 , for PIR1 and PIR3, QCI is much lower than ACI only if n/l 1. For PIR2 and PIR4, QCI can be pushed to a value much lower than ACI by increasing d and the number of servers. However, it is not always practical to use too many servers, and the side effect of using too many servers is also undesirable. Thus, rPIR is suitable for databases where data item size is not very small compared with the number of data items. To allow using rPIR for also huge databases with small data items, we can view a portion of a huge database as a new database and apply rPIR to the new database. In this case, the retrieved record is hidden among a portion of the original database instead of the whole original database. Applying itPIR to only a portion of a huge database is also a must because hiding the retrieved record among a huge database is computationally very costly and therefore impractical. As far as we know, in the experiments reported in PIR literature, the number of records is less than 1 million, and the biggest database size is 1 TB. For example, in the performance tests [29] , the latencies of querying a 100 GB database using two itPIR schemes are both tens of seconds. In contrast, hiding the retrieved record among a large portion of a database is secure enough usually [28] and less computationally costly. In the special case where an rPIR scheme is used in an application more Assuming that the number of servers is limited, rPIR schemes and corresponding parameters should be optimized under this limit to minimize the sum of ACI and QCI. Figure  3 depicts the minimal ACI for each rPIR scheme at different server limits on the number of servers. (Communication cost under privacy requirement will be discussed and evaluated later in this section). As shown in Fig. 3 , we can push rPIR's ACI to below 2 and even close to 1 if given enough servers. It can be further observed that ACI is reduced when the limit on the number of servers is increased. Also, ACI is smaller for lower values of t and d. For PIR2 and PIR4, we determine the minimal ACI by numerical evaluation. Thereby, we compute the ACIs of all possible numbers of servers and possible values of u 1 , u 2 , . . . ,u d under every given server number limit. Then, we pick the minimal ACI for every server number limit.
Considering communication cost as well as computational cost, we give some initial discussion on the choices of rPIR schemes in Table 3 . Later in Sect. 6, more discussion on the preferable rPIR scheme choices and their parameters will be given considering the usage scenario. We can see from TableTable 3 
CCI: considering data updating and privacy requirement
In case that the database does not change or just rarely changes and that QCI is much lower than ACI, we can put the focus on ACI in order to evaluate CCI. (Here, we also neglect the communication cost of initializing database servers assuming a server's upload traffic volume in its lifetime is much bigger than the database size.) However, in the case that the database changes often, we need to also consider the data updating cost aside of just ACI. From Table 2 and Fig. 3 , we notice that ACI can be reduced by increasing the number of servers. However, with growing number of servers, the communication cost also increases for updating the replicated database copies among all the servers. As such, we would like to determine the optimal number of servers that minimizes CCI, and evaluate CCI considering ACI and data updating cost. Assuming data change rate is R c data items/second, and the data access rate is R a data items/second, then we can use k × R c + AC I × R a to evaluate overall communication cost, and k × R c /R a + AC I to evaluate CCI. We show the relation between minimal CCI and server number limit in Fig. 4 . Similar to Fig. 3 , we determine the minimal CCI among all the cost values of all possible numbers of servers by numerical evaluation. From  Fig. 4 , it can be observed that CCI cannot be reduced further if R c /R a is not negligible and server number limit has reached a certain level. Increasing number of servers may also affect privacy. Let's consider the two assumptions: (1) every server's probability of being a colluding server, p, is the same; (2) the ratio of colluding servers is no more than a threshold T . From assumption 1), the probability of privacy leakage is the probability of more than t colluding servers among all k servers, which is
(To simplify the analysis, we also assume every server's probability of being a colluding server is independent from any other server, which is practical in some realistic scenarios, e.g., the P2P content delivery scenario presented later in Sect. 6.) Then, the probability of privacy leakage is reduced when number of servers k reduces or t increases. However, from Figs. 3 and 4 , we see that either reducing server number limit or increasing t leads to higher ACI and CCI. Under assumption 2), the number of colluding servers could be as big as round(T × k). In order to protect privacy, we must ensure t ≥ round(T × k), which then limits the number of servers. Therefore, no matter under which of the two assumptions, reducing CCI with/without data updating cost consideration is constrained by privacy requirements.
We depict the minimal CCI considering data updating cost under different privacy requirements in Fig. 6 , and minimal ACI (i.e., CCI without considering data updating cost) in Fig.  5 . In these two figures, we vary t and the number of servers k to find all schemes' minimal ACIs and CCIs under different privacy requirements and server number limits. For the plots with respect to privacy assumption 1), t and k are constrained by the upper limits of privacy leakage probability, meaning the maximal leakage probability that the user is willing to tolerate. For the plots with respect to assumption 2), t and k are constrained by t ≥ round(T × k), which assures that no privacy leakage is possible. Figures 5 and 6 compare our rPIR schemes and some typical schemes listed in Table 1 . We can see that rPIR schemes achieve much lower ACIs and CCIs at most privacy levels (but at the price of a higher number of servers), and increasing the number of servers is more helpful to reduce ACI and CCI under privacy assumption 1).
rPIR applications
Compared with traditional itPIR schemes, rPIR schemes have lower communication costs under certain settings in terms of the number of available servers, the record size and privacy requirement. But are these cases where rPIR schemes have a lower communication cost rare? If rPIR is used to retrieve a record's segments instead of multiple records, its computational cost is higher than traditional itPIR schemes'. So is rPIR's tradeoff between communication and compu- Fig. 4 Minimal CCI considering data updating and a limit on the number of deployed servers tational costs worthy? To answer above questions, in this section, we study rPIR's application in two very different scenarios and explore the effect of communication and computational costs vis-a-vis QoS and aggregate costs, using theoretic analysis and experiments.
Data sharing via multiple outsourced storages
Privacy-preserving outsourced data sharing based on itPIR
In this scenario, the database is replicated to multiple outsourced storages, e.g., storages provided by cloud or CDN (Content Delivery Network) providers. An outsourced storage is a "server" in PIR's model. Please note that a server means a logical entity (i.e., storage service) here, which may be implemented using multiple machines within a single cloud/CDN service. Suppose there is no colluding server because of the competition among cloud/CDN providers. Then, a 1-private itPIR scheme can be used. Suppose hiding a retrieved record among a sufficiently large set of records is secure enough no matter how big the database is. (This assumption is inspired by k-anonymity, and it was first exploited in [28] 's PIR scheme. It may be acceptable for some applications to make a tradeoff between performance and privacy, especially considering that performance is the major barrier to PIR's usage in practice.) Then, this set of records containing the retrieved record is viewed as a new database, and PIR can be applied to the new database. These records are called the cover records of the retrieved record. In such a scenario, rPIR schemes can be used in many settings in terms of the number of available servers, the record size and the number of cover records.
Comparing PIR1 with traditional itPIR
Traditional itPIR schemes' best CCI under above assumptions is about 2. This result can be achieved only if record size (in bits) is much bigger than the number of cover records. This follows from [2] 's t-private (t + 1)-server PIR scheme with the setting t = 1. This scheme is also the most computational efficient PIR scheme. [17] 's binary PIR protocols and main PIR protocols with setting t = 1, d = 1 and k = 2 can also achieve the same CCI but at the price of a higher computational cost. In contrast, PIR1 can achieve a lower CCI at the price of using a few more servers. Let's consider an example first. Suppose using 2 10 cover records is secure enough, and record size is 2 18 bits (32KB). If using k = 3 servers, each record is divided into k − t = 2 data items. ACI is k/(k − t) = 1.50. The number of items N is 2 11 , and item size l is 2 17 bits. In PIR1, CCI is 1 + N /l times of ACI. Then, CCI is about 1.52. As shown in Table 4 , PIR1 can also achieve lower CCI than traditional itPIR does under other settings of record size and number of cover records. servers. k − t = 4 data items. Then the item count is 2 12 , and item length is 2 16 bits. ACI is k/(k − t) = 1.25, and CCI is about 1.33.
As discussed in Sect. 3.2, a server's computational cost in PIR1 is the same as the cost in [2] 's t-private (t + 1)-server PIR scheme when t = 1. However, PIR1 uses more servers, and the total computational and storage costs of all servers are higher. (Please note that we discuss retrieving one record's segments in each query here. If retrieving multiple records instead, PIR1's total computational cost is lower than any existing itPIR scheme's.) rPIR makes a tradeoff of computational and storage costs for communication cost. This tradeoff is worthy if users or the data owner is more sensitive to communication cost. For example, mobile users may access data with very limited and expensive wireless bandwidth. Using rPIR can improve these users' QoS in terms of latency and/or save their expense on data traffic. Another example is where the database is popular, and the data owner pays much more money for servers' bandwidth usage than for storage and computing resource usage.
Let's take the price of Amazon's cloud service [30] to estimate the expenses in the second example. The price data used for the following estimation were obtained on April 16, 2014 . If renting the most powerful memory-optimized instance (r3.8xlarge) as a PIR server for 1 year, the price per month is between $739 and $1597 depending on the location of the instance (Amazon's pricing: from $8656 upfront and $0.528 per hour to $12432 upfront and $0.768 per hour). This kind of instance is chosen because PIR needs to read a lot of records to compute an answer and it is better to put the whole database in memory to improve performance. This kind of instance is more expensive than most other instances, which is in favor of traditional itPIR in the comparison of expenses. Suppose a PIR server's average upload traffic speed is 60 MB/s when using a traditional itPIR scheme. Then, the data owner should pay about $11,962 per month for the traffic from the server to PIR clients (Amazon's pricing: First 1 GB/month free; Up to 10 TB/month $0.120 per GB; Next 40 TB/month $0.090 per GB; Next 100 TB/month $0.070 per GB). Amazon doesn't charge for the traffic from Internet to its cloud. So only ACI matters here. If using traditional itPIR, 2 PIR servers are needed. Then, depending on the location of the instance, the data owner should pay $25,402-$27,118 per month for 2 servers and their traffic. (We are aware that 2 PIR servers should be provided and controlled by different cloud providers. We just use Amazon's pricing to estimate the cost.) If using PIR1 and 3 servers, ACI is reduced from 2 to 1.5, and a server's average upload traffic speed is reduced to 30 MB/s. Then, depending on the location of the instance, the data owner pays $22,125-$24,699 per month for 3 servers and their traffic, and saves about 9-13 % in overall costs.
Using other rPIR schemes
PIR3 may be used in this scenario as well, but its computational cost is at least twice that of PIR1's. As discussed in Sect. 3.2, about n × l/2 bit XOR operations are needed to compute an answer in PIR1 when t = 1. In contrast, as discussed in Sect. 4.2, about n × l/m XOR operations and multiplication table lookups in field F 2 m are needed to compute an answer in PIR3. n ×l/m XOR operations in field F 2 m The CCIs of using 3 and 5 servers are shown in one cell. The left CCI is the CCI for 3 servers, and the right one is for 5 servers is equivalent to n × l bit XOR operations. So PIR3 requires twice the XOR operations of PIR1, and PIR3 also needs the lookups in the multiplication table additionally. Thus, we don't recommend to use PIR3 here. Using PIR2 and PIR4 in this scenario can hide a small retrieved record among many records, and still achieve a low CCI. For example, a 32KB record can be hidden among 1 million records with the setting d = 2. To achieve a ACI of 2 and a CCI approaching to 2, PIR2 and PIR4 need 12 servers and 8 servers, respectively. Compared with PIR1, using PIR4 requires a relatively big number of servers to achieve a low CCI, which limits its usage. PIR2 requires more servers, which may not be practical today. If using traditional itPIR instead, 3 servers are required, and CCI is about 3. This result is due to [17] 's binary PIR protocols and main PIR protocols with setting t = 1, d = 2 and k = 3. The itPIR schemes [22] [23] [24] [25] listed in Table 1 can also achieve this result.
Summary
To sum up, in the outsourced storage scenario, PIR1 is useful in many settings in terms of the record size and the number of cover records when t = 1. PIR4 is useful when there is a need to hide small-sized retrieved records in many records. However, PIR4's usage is very limited because it requires a relatively big number of servers.
P2P content delivery
Privacy-preserving P2P content delivery based on itPIR
Because of P2P content delivery's high scalability as well as low CAPEX (capital expenditure) and OPEX (operational expenditure), some content service providers, e.g., PPLive
(now PPTV) [31] and Spotify [32], utilize not only their own content storage servers but also some or all user nodes to serve contents, particularly big contents. Such user nodes cache contents locally, and serve local contents for other users. We refer to this kind of user nodes as cache peers and all user nodes as peers. PIR can hide user interests from cache peers, where contents and cache peers are viewed as records and database servers, respectively, in PIR's model. PIR may hide user interests from the content service provider as well, or be used in pure P2P content delivery where there is no service provider and users publish and share their own contents. However, to show rPIR's usage in these settings, complicated P2P system design and P2P algorithm must be involved. Thus, in this paper, we consider only the simpler setting that there is a trusted content service provider. A content may be a whole file (e.g., music file, patent file) or a file chunk. For simplifying the demonstration of rPIR's usage, we consider here only the case that a content is a file. There are two cases of a trustable service provider. First, users don't mind the provider but mind other users to learn their interests. For example, users don't want other users to know what security patches they are downloading [33] . Second case is when even if users do not mind revealing their interests, the service provider does. If using CDN (Content Delivery Network) to delivery contents, CDN providers like Akamai usually commit to content service providers to protect user data including user interest data [34] . When using P2P content delivery, content service providers also have incentives to protect user interest data. A service provider may see user interest data as an important asset, which can be utilized to provide better services (e.g., content recommendation) and make money (e.g., targeted advertising), or may have legal obligation to protect user's privacy, even if they don't care. Consequently, the service provider may not want this data leaking to competitors or other parties.
A PIR-based P2P content delivery system is shown in Fig.  7 . Usually, all contents in the system are too big to fit in a peer's storage. So a cache peer caches only a portion of all the contents, and retrieved contents (i.e., records) are hidden in the portion (i.e., database). To use multi-server itPIR, some cache peers should hold the same contents and act as database servers in PIR's model. These peers form a group called cache group. As the service provider is trustable, it can control the number of cache groups, assign peers to cache groups, and assigns each cache group some contents to cache. These network management actions should consider factors like peer heterogeneity, content popularity, proximity between peers, etc. This is out of the scope of this paper. We only use some group setting examples to analyze PIR's performance in this paper. As shown in Fig. 7 , a user performs the following steps to find and retrieve a content item. First, the user obtains the content's ID and metadata by accessing the provider's portal server, e.g., a web server introducing contents. Second, Fig. 7 Privacy-preserving P2P content delivery based on itPIR the user obtains the content's index in a cache group and the group's cache peer list from the provider's tracker server, which manages the P2P content delivery system, and maintains the mappings from content IDs to information of cache groups. Third, the user retrieves the content from some or all peers in the cache group using an itPIR scheme.
Comparing PIR1/PIR3 with traditional itPIR
First, we give a cache group example and use it throughout for the comparison of PIR1/PIR3, traditional itPIR and anonymizers. Suppose each peer in the group caches the same 128 contents, and content size is 2MB. Suppose the ratio of colluding peers in the whole P2P system is 0.01. Then, in a cache group, the probability that a peer being a colluding peer is 0.01. Further, we assume a requirement of privacy leakage probability not more than 10 −6 . PIR1 and PIR3 can achieve a low CCI and meet the privacy requirement in such a cache group. If the group has 32 or more peers, PIR3 with setting t = 5 and k = 32 can be used. We can achieve an ACI of k/(k − t) = 32/27 ≈ 1.19 and still meet the privacy requirement. Each content is padded with 19 bytes of zeros and divided into k − t = 27 items. The number of items in the group, N , is 3456, and item size, l, is 621384 bits (77673 bytes). In PIR3, CCI is (1 + w × l/N ) times of ACI, and w is 8 in practice as discussed in Sect. 4.2. Then CCI is about 1.24. Similarly, if t = 3 and k = 8, ACI and CCI are both 1.6. Compared with PIR3, PIR1 requires to divide each content into more data items, which makes its QCI higher. As a result, the number of cache peers that PIR1 can utilize to reduce CCI is smaller. For example, PIR1 with setting t = 3 and k = 8 achieves an ACI and CCI of 1.60 and 1.63, respectively. However, if t = 5 and k = 32, ACI is reduced to 1.19, but CCI is over 2. Therefore, PIR3 can be used more widely. In Table 5 , we show PIR3's CCIs under The CCIs under three setting of t and k are shown in one cell. The left CCI is the CCI for t = 3 and k = 8; the CCI in the middle is for t = 4 and k = 16; the right one is for t = 5 and k = 32. Assuming peer collusion probability is 0.01, the privacy leakage probability is no more than 10 −6 under these settings of t and k some different content sizes and the number of contents in a cache group. Traditional itPIR schemes may be used in above cache group too, but their communication costs are higher. To meet the privacy requirement, ACI and CCI are at least 3. The result is due to [2] 's t-private (t + 1)-server PIR scheme with setting t = 2 or [17] 's binary PIR protocols and main PIR protocols with setting t = 2, d = 1 and k = 3. [2] 's scheme has a lower computational cost than [17] 's schemes and our rPIR schemes. Compared with [2] 's scheme, rPIR makes a tradeoff of computational cost for communication cost.
To see whether above tradeoff is worthy or not, we tested the computational performance of PIR1, PIR3 and [2]'s tprivate (t +1)-server PIR scheme, which is the most efficient traditional itPIR scheme under above cache group setting. The parameters of [2] 's scheme in the experiments are t = 2 and k = 3, which minimize its ACI, CCI and computational cost under the privacy requirement. For PIR1 and PIR3, we tested their performance under several settings of t and k that meet the privacy requirement. Performance was tested in high-end and low-end cache peers separately, and the results are shown in Figs. 8 and 9 . A high-end cache peer has a quadcore CPU (Intel Xeon W3565) with 8MB CPU cache, and CPU frequency is 3.2 GHz. A low-end cache peer has a dualcore CPU (Intel Core2 Duo P8600) with 3 MB CPU cache, and CPU frequency is 2.4 GHz. In the tests, we constrained PIR's CPU usage in a cache peer to 10 % and measured the cache peer's computational throughput, which is the peer's speed of generating answers, i.e., (total length of generated answers)/(the time used to generate the answers). Assuming there is no limit on cache peers' uplink speed, users can retrieve contents from cache peers at the speed of (the total computational throughput of cache peers)/ACI. This is the maximum system throughput without considering the possible influence of uplink speed limit. Then, a cache peer's maximum contribution to system throughput in this case is (the peer's computational throughput)/ACI. We refer to such contribution as ideal contribution for short. If considering uplink speed limit, the cache peer's maximum contribution to system throughput could be lower. A cache peer's uplink speed is limited by either the cache peer's uplink bandwidth or maximal allowed upload speed (set for P2P content delivery by the user to save bandwidth for other uses). We refer to the contribution considering uplink speed limit as actual contribution for short, and actual contribution under a given uplink speed limit, L s , can be evaluated by min(L s /ACI, ideal contribution).
As shown in Figs. 8 and 9, rPIR's ideal contribution and ACI drop when increasing the number of cache peers used in a retrieval. We can also see that PIR1's ideal contribution is a bit higher than PIR3's. PIR1 and PIR3 utilize uplink bandwidth more efficiently than traditional itPIR does, and their actual contributions are much higher than traditional itPIR's in most cases. Though traditional itPIR's computational throughput and ideal contribution are higher, what matters is the actual contribution considering uplink speed limit. The best ACI of traditional itPIR is 3, and 2/3 of the uplink bandwidth used by PIR is wasted. Then, traditional itPIR's actual contribution is no more than 1/3 of uplink speed limit. In contrast, PIR1 and PIR3 can maximize actual contribution by adjusting the number of peers used in each retrieval and achieve an actual contribution close to uplink speed limit. In the settings of Figs. 8 and 9, when uplink speed limit is lower than 3535.98 KB/s in a high-end cache peer or 438.66 KB/s in a low-end cache peer, rPIR's actual contribution is higher than traditional itPIR's. According to [35] , the uplink speeds in most countries are lower than these values. Also, CPU usage is limited to 10 % in our experiments. Many users may accept higher CPU usages and throughputs to match higher uplink bandwidths.
Comparing rPIR with anonymizers
Peers can act as anonymizers and protect user interest in P2P content delivery. If a user wants some content cached in a cache peer, the user utilizes one or more anonymizers to relay the content for it. To resist the colluding of anonymizers and the cache peer, two anonymizers are needed in a retrieval under the same privacy assumptions used above: the probability that a peer being a colluding peer is 0.01; the probability of privacy leakage must not exceed 10 −6 . Then, the CCI of the setup using anonymizers is 3, and 2/3 of the uplink bandwidth used by cache peers and anonymizers is wasted. Similar to traditional itPIR, users can retrieve contents from cache peers at the speed of only 1/3 of the total uplink bandwidth used by all cache peers and anonymizers. Though the computational cost of anonymizers relaying content is very low, the bottleneck is communication cost. In contrast, rPIR balances computational and communication costs, which allows the same number of peers to contribute more on system throughput. 
Using other rPIR schemes
PIR2 and PIR4 may be used as well. They can hide a small retrieved content among many contents, but they require many peers to achieve a low CCI and low privacy leakage probability. For example, a retrieved content of 8 KB can be hidden among 100,000 contents with PIR4's setting d = 2. Suppose the probability that a peer being a colluding peer is 0.01, and privacy leakage probability is not allowed to exceed 10 −6 . A CCI of 2.67 can be achieved using 32 cache peers, and at least 95 cache peers in a cache group are required to achieve a CCI lower than 2. Because a cache peer's upload traffic should be much higher than its download traffic of the cached contents, only very popular contents should be cached in a cache group of many peers, which limits PIR4 usage. PIR2 is not recommended because it requires more peers than PIR4 does. If using traditional itPIR instead, 7 cache peers are required, and CCI is about 7. This result is due to [17] 's binary PIR protocols and main PIR protocols with setting t = 3, d = 2 and k = 7.
Summary
To sum up, PIR1 and PIR3 can be used to hide the retrieved content among hundreds of contents, and their maximum system throughput is higher than traditional itPIR's and anonymizers'. PIR4 is useful when there is a need to hide small-sized retrieved contents in many contents. However, PIR4's usage is limited because it requires many cache peers in a cache group to achieve a low CCI.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, a new family of information-theoretic PIR based on ramp secret sharing, rPIR, has been studied. Four rPIR schemes have been proposed, and three ramp secret sharing schemes are adopted in these rPIR designs. rPIR's usages has been demonstrated in outsourced data sharing and P2P content delivery scenarios. The performance of rPIR schemes has been evaluated by theoretic analysis and experiments under different numbers of available servers and privacy requirements. The results have shown that rPIR schemes can achieve several times lower communication costs and the same level of privacy compared with traditional information theoretic PIR schemes. It has also been experimentally evaluated that rPIR's tradeoff of computational cost for communication cost is worthy for some cases in outsourced data sharing scenario and most cases in P2P content delivery scenario.
